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Article 3

Patent Law Reform and the Expansion of Provisions
Relating to Licensing
THEODORE L. BOWES*
Patent law "reform" has been before Congress since the report of
the President's Commission on the Patent System in 1966.' Proposals for revision can be loosely catalogued into two categories. The
first involves the establishment of the patent right, ranging from the
invention, the inventor, the patent application, the Patent and
Trademark Office examination, and the issuance of a patent, to the
enforcement of the patent right. The second category, with which
this article is concerned, involved the use of the patent right and the
concomitant privilege to license others.
The Report of the President's Commission included a proposal
dealing specifically with the licensable nature of the patent right.2
However, none of the pending legislation includes provisions for
codifying or clarifying patent licensing. 3 An analysis of the problems
* Executive Director, Intellectual Property Owners, Inc., Washington, D.C. B.S.E.E., University of Illinois, 1930; LL.B., George Washington University National Law Center, 1937.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views
of IPO, Inc. or its members.
1. A President's Commission on the Patent System was appointed on April 8, 1965, by
President Johnson. Its report was dated November 17, 1966. Many proposals for the amendment of the patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970) preceded that report.
2. Recommendation XXII read as follows:
The licensable nature of the rights granted by a patent should be clarified by
specifically stating in the patent statute that: (1) applications for patents, patents,
or any interest therein may be licensed in the whole, or in any specified part, of
the field of use to which the subject matter of the claims of the patent are directly
applicable, and (2) a patent owner shall not be deemed guilty of patent misuse
merely because he agreed to a contractual provision or imposed a condition on a
licensee, which has (a) a direct relation to the disclosure and claims of the patent,
and (b) the performance of which is reasonable under the circumstances to secure
to the patent owner the full benefit of his invention and patent grant. This recommendation is intended to make clear that the "rule of reason" shall constitute the
guide-line for determining patent misuse.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM 36 (1966).
3. A bill For the general reform and modernization of the Patent Laws was drafted in the
Executive Branch, with special attention from White House staff personnel and introduced
by Senator Scott of Pennsylvania. S. 2504, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (1973). This bill and several
other so-called reform bills died in the 93d Congress. Another bill was introduced by the
Nixon Administration in the 94th Congress. S. 2255, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1974). On January
31, 1975, the current version of this bill was introduced. None'of the Administration proposals
have included provisions for clarifying or codifying licensing law pertaining to patents. In a
White House press release dated September 27, 1973, President Nixon stated:
In addition, the existing state of case law on antitrust standards for patent licensing
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and view-points of the licensors and licensees who would be affected
most directly, is needed.
THE IMPORTANCE OF PATENTS

The support for patents in the United States is found in the
Constitution. The Preamble states: "We the People of the United
States, in Order to . . . establish Justice . . . promote the general
Welfare. . . ." Article I, section 8 contains the grant of power to the

Congress to promote the progress of the useful arts by securing for
limited times to inventors the exclusive rights to their discoveries.
Thus, the general welfare of the United States is to be promoted by
the provision of exclusivity and this, in the judgment of the Congress as early as 1790, has been in the form of the issuance of patents, thereby establishing justice for inventors and their financiers,
and promoting the public welfare by disclosure of inventions to the
public through the issuance of patents.
Most corporations freely license patents and information here and
abroad. Royalty income alone contributes materially to the profits
of many enterprises. Also, there are tangible, more general, benefits
to our economy because of widespread licensing and the resulting
exchange of technical information. While it seems easier to understand how large companies benefit from the patent system, the
maintenance of strong patents and the right to license freely should
be even more important to small companies and individual inventors.
Ideas advanced by the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice with respect to common licensing practices, such as a license
to make a definite product, to practice an invention in a specified
field or fields, for a specified term of years, if established, would
destroy much royalty return, about half of which is paid out in
income taxes, and make licensing relatively worthless. If it should
become more practical to maintain inventions in secret, the public
suffers.
LIMITED LICENSING CONSIDERATIONS

Before beginning an analysis of specific legislative language it
that have been determined by the courts would not be changed. Some have argued
that this case-by-case approach to patent licensing has increasingly eroded the
value and reliability of the patent grant. Earlier this year, I requested that various
proposals addressed to this issue be carefully studied and reviewed by the Secretary
of Commerce, the Attorney General, and my chief advisors on economic policy.
After much study, they concluded that there is no clearly demonstrated need or
justification for introduction of any patent licensing proposals at this time.
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may be useful to consider licensing from the standpoint of a businessman, whether a licensor, or licensee, or both, and not as an
exercise in legislative rationalization. Too frequently, the latter has
been used to the exclusion of the practical aspects-the facts of
business life.
There are those who argue that exclusivity pertains to a patent
only so long as the owner holds it solely for his own activities; that
once he grants a license, he must license all others on the same
terms and conditions.4 A patent, however, is not a commodity offered in a department store or a supermarket. The underlying invention is unique and licensing its use involves consideration of many
factors, some of primary concern to the licensor and others of primary interests to the licensee. 5
4. The WHrrE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST PoucY included a recommendation that "in general, a patent owner who has granted a license with respect to his patent
must license all qualified applicants on equivalent terms." The report was released on May
21, 1969 and reported in 411 ANTrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 10 (1969). The position of
the Antitrust Division is stated by former Assistant Attorney General Donald F. Turner: "In
due course, I expect that we will bring a case directly challenging restrictions of this type."
13 IDEA 803, 805 (1969). See also Turner, The Patent System and Competition Policy, 44
N.Y.U.L. REv. 450, 471 (1969).
5. Among these are:
Cost of the development to the patent owner and licensee;
Anticipated volume of sales;
Patent owner's product line and market position;
Need for exclusivity;
Territory;
Availability of substitutes not under patent;
Number of patents involved;
Scope of invention versus scope of patent coverage;
Ease of circumventing patent;
Need for licenses under patents of others;
Relative value of invention in different fields of use;
Capability of licensee to serve all fields of use;
Need for lead times;
Need for further technical development;
Need for market development;
Need for investment in production facilities;
Financial responsibility of licensee;
Expected savings from use of invention;
Need for technical assistance from patent owner;
Need for use of trade secret;
Availability to licensee of later improvements by patent owner;
Fair royalty;
Base for royalty determination;
Protection against later licenses at lower royalties;
Exchange of licenses in lieu of royalty;
Non-exclusive rights to patent owner in improvements by licensee;
Right to grant sublicenses;
Detectability of infringement;
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Licensing arrangements must be palatable to both licensors and
licensees. Opponents of limited licenses, who apparently believe
that all limitations in licenses are strong-arm tactics of the patent
owner, seem to have lost sight of this fact. Licensees normally want
the license to cover only what they wish to do and to be licensed only
where they know the license is necessary. Other applications of the
invention may not justify as high a rate of royalty; indeed, other
uses may not even be known so that an appropriate royalty for all
uses cannot be determined. Thus, both parties wish to tailor the
language to the known and now, leaving other products or fields to
later negotiations as conditions develop. In other words, freedom to
draft the license contract to fit the technological and business situations facing the parties is necessary to provide the maximum benefit
for both the public and the parties involved.
A simple designation of a field or product licensed is not restrictive or prohibitory in any way. It is merely a permissive conveyance
of less than all rights. The fact that parties to a license may, in some
cases, act as though express prohibitions are present does not detract from this simple fact.' There is another important justification
for field-of-use licensing. Some uses may be beyond a patent owner's
ability or capacity. It is in the public interest then for him to license
others to make and sell in other technological fields or territories.
Such licensing practices are therefore not inherently anticompetitive, or monopolistic.
In addition, there are very practical reasons for field-of-use licensing. Members of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
and especially the members of the Patent Section of that division
are highly competent and intelligent attorneys, but not many of
Willingness of patent owner to enforce patent against unlicensed infringers;
Willigness of patent owner to defend licensee against infringement suits brought by
others;
Conditions for terminating the license.
6. Department of Justice spokesmen have alleged that a simple license is the same, in
effect, as a positive prohibition. This assumes that the parties mean something other than
what they say and implies bad faith. For example, in United States v. Ciba Corp., Civil No.
791-69 (D.N.J., filed March 27, 1975), the Justice Department's brief states:
While the Abbott agreement does not expressly forbid Abbott from selling bulk
form Hydrochlorothiazide, it does not include the right to sell the bulk form of that
drug. The difference between an unlimited license with a negative covenant against
the sale of bulk, on the one hand, and a limited license to sell only in dosage form,
on the other hand, is one of semantics. . . . There is no meaningful distinction
between the two verbal formulations of a bulk sales restriction, since the end result
is the same: the licensee [here Abbott] is in practice prevented from selling bulk.
Brief for Plaintiff, at 74 n. 96, United States v. Ciba Corp., Civil No. 791-69 (D.N.J., filed
March 27, 1975).
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them have had practical experience in negotiating licenses as owners of, or attorneys for an ongoing concern and, therefore, they are
unfamiliar with the needs and problems unique to business.7 This
is an area where the practical, everyday experience with the problems of designing, manufacturing and selling in the market place is
far superior to abstract academic rationalization. The Antitrust
Division would better serve the public interest by giving more
weight to the businessman's problems and experience.
When a number of different applications for the patented item are
apparent, the same terms and conditions are not necessarily equally
appropriate for all licenses. Because of the differences between applications of a given invention, the royalty base, in order to be
reasonably applicable, may have to be different. It is not possible
to define accurately what the royalty base should be until the parties know what the product or process is going to be. If the royalty
is to be a fixed sum for each device sold, rather than a percentage
of the selling price, the fixed sum would logically vary among
different devices.
If the license covers more than a single patent, the list of patents
applicable for any particular device may not, and in most cases will
not, be the same for a different device in a different application and
may involve some patents which were inapplicable in the other
field. For example, one product or field may involve patents A, B,
C, and D whereas another application may require a license only
under patent A. A license agreement should not force on the licensee
patents B, C, and D which he neither wants nor needs.
A field-of-use license is especially useful in fields having extensive
patent protection because licensees (and licensors under cross
licenses) are able to make, use and sell in the licensed field with
freedom from problems of infringement of the licensor's patents (or
both sets of patents, if cross-licensed).
An agreement in one field may include manufacturing and engineering information but the licensor may not have information to
give in another field. These differing requirements may cause fluctuation in price. In one field, the royalty might be a percentage of
the selling price where the patented device is sold, but so many
cents or dollars per device or on some other basis in another field.
Where the patented device is sold in combination with something
7.

Statement of Karl E. Bakke, General Counsel, Department of Commerce, NATIONAL
March 30, 1974, at 479. Mr. Bakke is reported to have said that "none of
the parties in the White House discussion had ever actively practiced in the patents field.
Thus, many issues were being resolved in the dark."
JOURNAL REPORTS,
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else, the entire combination may not be covered by the patent and
thus a royalty percentage of the selling price may be inappropriate.
It is not always. to a licensee's advantage to take the broadest
possible license. For example, one design may be a clear infringement and another may not; hence, the prospective licensee may be
willing to take a license with respect to the first but is prepared to
challenge the patent with respect to the other.
In a multi-division company, an all-inclusive license may be particularly difficult to work out because of the necessity for a large
number of approvals and considerations peculiar to different divisions. The field-of-use approach enables the licensee to work out an
arrangement with the licensor peculiarly suited to the needs of the
division or even the product line directly involved.
It is to a licensee's advantage to be free to negotiate each situation
as it arises. He wants to commit himself only for the particular
product or product line being planned or in production and either
wants to eliminate any commitment on speculative areas or
postpone negotiation until additional areas and the problems connected with them become clear.
Inasmuch as a licensor is frequently involved in the manufacture
and sale of products covered by patents, the licensee, reasonably,
may be able to get a license only in fields outside the area of activity
of the licensor. Further, the licensor may be willing to grant a lower
royalty rate in the field where he is not commercially active since
there will be no risk of reducing the licensor's business.
A licensee frequently seeks a paid-up license rather than a license
spread over a long term. Because of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of anticipating all possible uses, a typical licensor may justifiably insist on a high lump sum if the license is to cover all fields
but may be quite willing to agree to a lower lump sum for a license
in a narrow or a simple field. Viewed from a different perspective,
a licensee might not feel able to pay the larger sum justified for all
fields, especially when he foresees no use on his part for the patent
rights in fields other than the one of immediate interest to him.
Similarly, a licensee may be able to negotiate licenses of narrow
scope, a lower annual ceiling or a low ceiling on royalty to be paid
over the life of the agreement but, as was the case with the lump
sum payments, a licensor may want to be assured of a much higher
return if he must license in all fields. A ceiling satisfactory to a
licensor on an all-field basis may be so high that the licensee would
never reach the ceiling and, therefore, never get any benefit from it
if he operates only in one or a few fields.
In many situations, a licensee wants (and a licensor is willing to
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provide for) a sliding scale with reduced rates as volume increases.
As with some of the foregoing examples, the licensor would be justified in requiring a much larger bracket before dropping to a lower
rate if all fields are involved, whereas a licensee might very well be
granted a reduction in rate at much lower volume levels if the license is granted to a narrow field.
It is quite common to provide a variety of bases for permitting a
licensee to terminate his license. Thus, with appropriate provisions,
if a license is of narrow scope and the licensee thinks that he is able
to design around a licensed patent, he can readily terminate the
agreement. If, however, he is forced to accept a license under a large
number of fields or all fields and he is active in fields in which he
has not been able to develop a non-infringing alternative, he may
not be able to terminate and, hence, will be discouraged from designing around the licensed invention. If there is a minimum royalty
provided for in the agreement, he can save the minimum payments
by cancelling in the fields where he stops selling.
In a period when businesses are freely transferred, a licensee may
want separate licenses for each field so that he will have the maximum freedom to assign licenses with his business in each field. Of
course, a single license would reasonably be indivisible.
Further, it is not always advantageous to a licensor to grant the
broadest possible license. He, too, usually benefits if he has the
freedom to negotiate each particular situation. A multi-division licensor has the same problem with respect to approvals in negotiation as does the multi-division licensee and so from either standpoint, the negotiation on a field-by-field basis is much simpler and
a final agreement can be completed in much less time.
Under the present patent laws, a patent owner is not required to
grant licenses. Some patent owners do not license patents which
have only a single field of application. However, the right to license
fields-of-use encourages the patent owner to make the patented invention available outside of his own field, thereby benefitting a
much broader segment of the public. Licenses in defined fields often
provide the public with a variety of products that would not otherwise be made available during the life of the patent. Different licensees while operating under independent licenses may, and often do,
develop novel applications of the licensed invention.
The Antitrust Division has evidenced concern because licensees
have not, in fact, acted outside the licensed field.8 As explained
8. The author has heard Department of Justice attorneys argue that failure to act outside
the licensed field is evidence of an agreement not to make, use or sell in nonlicensed fields.
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above, many licensees accept a license only to clear the legal scene
for a particular product; simply, the licensee may have no other
interest and may wish solely to avoid infringement. The Antitrust
Division apparently assumes that failure to operate outside the licensed field effects a division of markets and if the licensee did not
have a license, he would infringe in other fields. If so, the Division
clearly fails to understand the reasons for limited licenses.
To illustrate the ambiguous position taken by the Antitrust Division regarding field-of-use licenses: NASA has announced its intent to grant exclusive licenses for limited fields of use,9 the Department of Justice uses field-of-use provisions in consent degrees,'"
and the Department of Defense regularly uses this device." If the
Government itself finds this form of licensing useful, why should it
be unsuitable for use by nongovernment parties?'"
The problem faced by inventors, research organizations, and universities is different. Since they are not involved in the areas of
production and sale their inventions can reach the public only
through assignment or licensing. Unless they can find a company
large enough and diversified enough to take on all uses (and even
in this case, such a licensee would no doubt develop only one use at
Cf. Address by Richard H. Stem, before the Antitrust Law Section of the New York State
Bar Association, in New York City, January 27, 1971, in which he stated that "niceties in
wording will not save what is otherwise an unlawful scheme."
9. 14 C.F.R. 1245, § 203(d)(2) (1976). The GSA has withdrawn a similar regulation directed to exclusive licenses for all fields or less than all fields of use because of an attack on
its legality in court. See 41 C.F.R. 101-04, §103.3(c)(1) (1976).
10. See STAFF REPORT OF THE SENATE SUBCOMMirITFE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING UNDER ANTITRUST JUDGMENTS, S. RES. 240, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 18-22 (1960).
11. Part IX, Armed Services Procurement Regulation provides for licenses to the Government for governmental purposes.
12. See Memorandum on the Need for Legislative Clarification of the Law Relating to
Patent License Provisions, submitted to the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks
and Copyrights, S. 2576, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as APLA Memo]. The
memorandum notes:
There is a paradox in the Department's position. While it urges that field of use
patent licenses are just as illegal as efforts at market division where no patents are
involved, it would sanction such licenses where the patent owner was reserving to
himself a portion of the total field covered by the patent. It would seem that if the
licensee is impliedly agreeing to stay out of the patent's field in one case, he is doing
so in the other.
Moreover, an agreement to divide markets between competitors consitutes a per
se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. If field of use licenses are equated to
division of market agreements then they, too, must be per se antitrust violations.
On what basis, then, can the Department of Justice find some field of use licenses
justificable and others not?
Id. at 3408.
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a time), they risk attack for antitrust violations. The type of patent
owner under consideration, small business firms, and even many
larger firms, may feel unable to stand up to such attacks.
There should be no discrimination of patent licenses vis-a-vis
copyright licenses; yet a novel may be cut up into serialization, hard
cover book form, paperback form, stage rights, moving picture
rights, and television rights, without attack. These licenses of less
than the whole right, as suggested above with respect to field-of-use
grants, afford the public several forms of presentation and opportunity to absorb the plot and treatment in different styles. The
present patent statute'3 provides that patents have the attributes of
personal property. From this, it seems that a patent owner should
have the rights possessed by owners of other types of property, such
as the right to dispose of all or part at any time, in any territory and
to as many or as few as he chooses.
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF LIMITED LICENSING

During the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first
seventeen years of the twentieth, patent owners had almost unlimited scope in determining the nature of the grants in patent license
agreements and even restrictions on such grants. In 1902, for example, a majority of the United States Supreme Court, upholding tieins in patent cases, said that the right of a patentee-owner to license
"subject to any qualification in respect of time, place, manner, or
purpose of use is so elementary we shall not stop to cite cases.'",
However, in Bauer v. O'Donnell'5 and Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co.,'" the first breaches of the licensor's rights, the Supreme Court held that price restrictions and tying conditions, respectively, were outside the scope of patent law. Since these early
decisions, there have been dozens of cases diminishing the freedom
of licensors to license on terms of their own choosing." The 1955
13. 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
14. Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 18 (1912).
15. 229 U.S. 1 (1913). There the Court held invalid an attempt to reserve the right to fix
the price at which a patented article could be resold by the vendee. This, according to the
Court, was an attempt to unduly extend the right to vend, as distinguished from a license
for a qualified use.
16. 243 U.S. 502 (1917). The case overruled Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), and held
that the exclusive right to use does not empower the patent owner, by notices attached to
the patented articles, to extend the scope of the patent monopoly by restricting their use to
materials necessary for their operation, but forming no part of the patented invention.
17. The following cases are illustrative of many which have affected the licensor's right:
see University of Illinois v. Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc., 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1972) (in rem
invalidity); Learney & Trecker v. Giddings & Lelwis, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 650 (1971) (royalty
on entire machine); Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) (license estoppel doctrine); United
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Report of the Attorney General's National Committee To Study the
Antitrust Laws 8 took account of this erosion and established guidelines to avoid patent misuse." However, the attack continued in
succeeding years.
President Johnson appointed a commission to study the patent
system and make recommendations. The Commission's report
stated that uncertainty had developed in the law with respect to
patent licensing practices and recommended legislative clarification.20 The Commission recommendation specifically referred to the
licensable nature of patents and patent applications (identifying
specifically fields of use), and the necessity of making clear that a
States v. AMA 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (free cross license may harm competition);
American Photocopy v. Rovico, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 631 (1966) (set aside injunction on
finding of exhorbitant royalty rates); FTC v. LaPeyre, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966) (different
royalty rates); Hazeltine Corp. v. Zenith, 239 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. Ill. 1965) (foreign patent
pool); Brulotte v. Thys, 379 U.S. 29 (1964) (post-expiration royalties); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel, 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (federal preemption); Compco v. Daybrite, 376 U.S. 235 (1964)
(federal preemption. But see Kewanee v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470 (1974); United States v. Singer
Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963) (settlement of interference with cross-license); United States
v. Lever Brothers, 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (patents are assets under § 7 of the
Clayton Act); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (tie-ins virtually held unlawful
per se); United States v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (exclusive
license is an asset under § 7 of the Clayton Act); American Security Company v. Shatterproof
Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959) (compulsory package license); United States v.
Associated Patents, 134 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Mich. 1958) (grant back plus patent pool evidences
conspiracy in restraint of trade); Newburgh Moire v. Superior Moire, 237 F.2d 283 (3d Cir.
1956) (multiple licenses with price fixing); United States v. United States Gypsum, 333 U.S.
364 (1948) (industry network to stablize prices); United States v. Line Material, 333 U.S. 287
(1948) (cross licenses involving price fixing); Lincoln Electric Co. v. Linde Air Products, 171
F.2d 223 (6th Cir. (1948) (license only purchasers of articles to use method); Mercoid Corp.
v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) (sale of unpatented switches not
contributory infringement); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942) (mutual
agreements among distributors); United States v. Univis Lens, 316 U.S. 241 (1942) (limitation placed on fixing of retail prices); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488
(1942) (use of unpatented salt); American Lecithin v. Warfield Co., 105 F.2d 207 (7th Cir.
1939) (implied licenses); Barber Asphalt Corp. v. La Fero Grecco Construction Co., 116 F.2d
211 (3d Cir. 1940) (different royalty according to where purchased); IBM v. United States,
298 U.S. 131 (1936) (purchase of IBM tabulating cards); Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931) (purchase of unpatented dry ice); Motion
Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (tie-ins).
18. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS (1955). [hereinafter cited as 1955 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT]

19.
20.

Id. at 223-58.

The report stated:
[T]here is much uncertainty in the law of patent licensing and legislative clarification is needed. ...
[U]ncertainty exists as to the precise nature of the patent right. . . . This has
produced confusion in the public mind and a reluctance by patent owners and
others to enter into contracts or other arrangements pertaining to patents or other
arrangements pertaining to patents or related licenses.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM 37 (1966).

19771

Patent-Antitrust Interface

rule of reason should constitute the guideline for determining patent
misuses.2 The American Bar Association endorsed this recommended principle in 1967.2
Of great concern to patent owners with respect to the present
state of the law and future expectancy, were the many strong and
positive statements made by members of the Antitrust Division.23
Mr. James W. Wetzel stated:
Accordingly, Mr. McLaren, Mr. Stern and another Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Bruce B. Wilson, have been jaunting around
the country since at least June of last year saying essentially the
same things each time. When they speak of legal decisions they
always speak of them in terms of their own over-interpretation,
presumably so because they seek to stimulate fright. They talk
specifically about attacking field-of-use licensing, grant back
clauses, royalty clauses, etc. ... 24
As pointed out by another commentator, the cases cited for support
by these spokesmen often have nothing to do with patents or licensing.25 In opposing any legislative proposals, the Antitrust Division
has not only argued that license law revision or clarification is not
necessary, but has vigorously attacked many common licensing
practices."6
21. Id. at 36.
22. In 1967, the American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted the following
resolution:
The licensable nature of patent rights should be clarified by specifically stating
in the patent statute that applications for patents, patents, or any interest therein
may be licensed in the whole, or in any specified part, of the field of use to which
the subject matter of the claims of the patent are directly applicable, and FURTHER, that a patent owner shall not be deemed guilty of patent misuse merely
because he agreed to a contractual provision or imposed a condition on a licensee,
which has (a) a direct relation to the disclosure and claims of the patent, and
(b) the performance of which is reasonable under the circumstances to secure to
the patent owner the full benefit of his invention and patent grant; and FURTHER,
that the Section approves of legislation by which it is made clear that the "rule of
reason" shall constitute the guideline for determining patent misuse.
23. For a compilation of pronouncements by members of the Antitrust Division, see Hearings on S. 643 Before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the
Senate Committee of the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 658 et seq. (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings]; Oppenheim, The Patent-AntitrustSpectrum of Patent and
Know-How License Limitations: Accomodation? Conflict? or Antitrust Supremacy?, 6 LES
NOUVELLES 86 (1971), [hereinafter cited as Oppenheim].
24. 5 LES NouvELL~s 289 (1970).
25. See Dobbs, Whose Future Look at Patent Fraud and Antitrust Laws?, 5 LES
NOUVELLEs 253 (1970).
26. In a pamphlet published by the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. it is stated:
More recently, the Antitrust Division's jaundiced eye for patent licensing restrictions has focused specifically on clauses limiting the licensed use of the patented
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The Antitrust Division has advanced a two-pronged test for use
in determining whether to attack a particular licensing provision or
practice. According to spokesmen for the division, they ask two
questions: first, is the particular provision necessary for the patentee's exploitation of his lawful monopoly; and second, is a less restrictive alternative available. 7 When the answer to the first question is "no" and to the second "yes," the Government considers
challenging the restriction."8 After announcing this test, then Assistant Attorney General Richard W. McLaren stated: "That summary
formulation however, was never intended to be used to determine
the legality of patent licensing restrictions we would 'consider' prosecuting."I However, the test was in no way limited to restrictions
falling outside the valid patent grant.1 This test is not only a novel
approach to the problem, but also an unworkable solution in the
area of limited patent licensing. Any time there is a limitation of
any form in a license the answer to the first question will almost
necessarily be "no" because it is hardly ever "necessary." The answer to the second question will almost always be "yes" because
there will almost always be a "less restrictive alternative." Nowhere
in the patent statute or in any court decision is there any requirement that the licensor establish the necessity of a particular license
provision or that he demonstrate the absence of any less restrictive
alternative. The test attempts to extend the effect of the antitrust
laws far beyond their reasonable scope into the patent area. The test
has been sharply criticized because of its ambiguity as well as its
3
overbroad effects. '
Although the Antitrust Division recognizes there is no necessary
or essential conflict between the patent system and the antitrust
laws, the Government maintains that the legality of arrangements
such as tying the sale of the patented products to the purchase of
invention to a designated apparatus, process, or field of business activity. Although
no law suits have yet been filed Mr. Turner announced that he was "looking for
good cases in which to test the legality of 'restricted use' clauses in patent
licenses.
ANTITRUST TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), Patents and the Antitrust Law (1966).
With respect to grant backs, Mr. Turner stated that the Antitrust Division was seeking a
proper test case to establish that exclusive grant backs were per se illegal. Turner, Patents,
Antitrust and Innovation, 28 U. PITT. L. REV. 151, (1966).
27. Address by Assistant Attorney General Richard W. McLaren, Conference of the PTC
Research Institute of George Washington University, in Washington, D.C., June 5, 1969.
28. Id.
29. Address by Assistant Attorney General Richard W. McLaren, before the Antitrust
Section, American Bar Association, London, Eng., July 15, 1971, reprinted in 36 PTC JOUR.
E-1 (1971).
30. See Whale, Antitrust Encroachment on Patent Imperatives, 47 CHI-KENT L. REV. 125
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Whale].
31. APLA Memo, note 12 supra
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unpatented material, agreements not to deal with non-patented
competing products, or other patent-related practices are to be measured by the antitrust laws and not the patent laws.32 Tying, for
example, is considered by some members of the Antitrust Division
as illegal per se, 33 yet courts have permitted use of the practice in
limited situations involving patent licensing.3 4 Other licensing practices thought to be reasonable uses of the patent are being challenged by the Antitrust Division. Mr. McLaren stated:
Other practices which are either presently being challenged or
which I expect will be questioned in the future, include some types
of field-of-use licenses, restrictions on the form or manner of resale
of patented products, and contractual provisions which tend to
35
inhibit the granting of future licenses.
The Department of Justice has maintained this opposition to license restrictions in public statements by the involved officials as
3
well as its stance on patent reform legislation.
32. Address by Assistant Attorney General Richard W. McLaren, before the Antitrust
Section American Bar Association, London, July 15, 1971.
33. McLaren condemned tying as per se illegal in the patent licensing situation:
I am speaking of such practices as tying the sale of patented products to the
purchase of unpatented material, agreements to refrain from challenging the validity of patents under which no license has been granted, agreements not to deal in
goods which compete with products covered by the patent, and the like.
Address by Assistant Attorney General Richard W. McLaren, Conference of the PTC Research Institute of George Washington University, Washington, D.C., June 5, 1969.
34. See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd
per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); Electric Pipe v. Fluid Systems, Inc., 109 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 24 (2nd Cir. 1956).
35. Address of Assistant Attorney General Richard W. McLaren, before the Antitrust
Section, American Bar Association, London, July 15, 1971.
36. On many occasions, officials of the Department of Justice have made statements
which have contributed materially to the confusion among those concerned about the present
and future legality of many patent licensing practices. Among these is the address by Baddia
J. Rashid, Deputy Director of Operations for the Antitrust Division, to the Peninsula Patent
Association, Palo Alto, Cal., January 19, 1966:
The power to exclude is in itself an appropriate reward for the patentee's invention,
and he can reap monopoly profits if he remains the sole manufacturer. And if he
chooses to grant licenses, thereby dissipating his power to exclude, he receives a
royalty in exchange which is commensurate with the value of the invention. Depending on the importance of the invention, this royalty can be fixed at such a level
that it will afford the patentee some protection against under-pricing and competitive sales. But there is nothing in the patent laws which justified additional restrictions to insulate the patentee from competition, once he has extracted all that
traffic will bear in the way of royalties.
Former Assistant Attorney General Richard W. McLaren, in an address to the PTC Research
Institute of George Washington Unviersity, Washington, D.C., June 5, 1969, expressed his
desire to challenge some types of field-of-use licenses and bulk sale restrictions, restrictions
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This approach proffered by the Department of Justice has not
gone unchallenged. Professor S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, cochairman of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws, said:
[M]y prime concern is that pronouncements of top officials of the
Department of Justice Antitrust Division from 1965 to date reflect
enforcement attitudes which tend to subordinate the Congressionally sanctioned exclusive rights of the patentee to antitrust policy
considerations. If the courts should respond favorably to this reoriented thinking of the Antitrust Division, the end result would
be to drift from progress toward accommodation of patent and
antitrust policies to increased conflict between them if not to
antitrust erosion of lawful patent rights.37
The two-pronged test seems to have been replaced by the doctrine
of ancillary and necessary restraints from which it was originally
derived. The "ancillary restraints" doctrine set forth in United
States v. General Electric Co.,3" may have been severely limited by
later cases,39 but it seems the Antitrust Division would deny the
right of the licensor still protected under General Electric despite
recent Supreme Court refusal to repudiate the protection. 0 Assistant Attorney General Richard H. Stern, head of the Patent Section
of the Antitrust Division, has maintained that even though a restriction is reasonably within the scope of the patent, the antitrust inquiry is not ended."
on the form and manner of resale of patented products and contractual provisions tending to
inhibit further licensing. See note 33 supra. At the same meeting, he enunciated his "no-yes"
test, see note 28 supra and accompanying text, since replaced by the "ancillary and reasonable restraint" test. He explained the latter approach in Williamsburg, Va., October 10, 1970:
The rule is derived from the doctrine of ancillary restraints and embraces three
principal elements. First, the restriction must be ancillary to carrying out the lawful
primary purpose of the agreement. Second, the scope and duration of the restraint
must be no broader than is necessary to support that primary purpose. And third,
the restriction must be otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. In effect, the
rule on knowhow licensing is pretty much the same as the rule on patent licensing:
Except as to certain well-known restraints which are per se unlawful, the standard
is the rule of reason.
Roland W. Donnem, one-time Director of Policy Planning for the Antitrust Division, declared that certain field-of-use limitations and restrictions on the form or manner of selling
violate the Sherman Act because of their adverse affect of competition. 1970 MICH. ST. B. J.
35.
37. Oppenheim, note 23, supra at 86.
38. 272 U.S. 476 (1926). See 1955 ATTORNEY GENERAL's REPORT at 86-88.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
40. United States v. Huck, 382 U.S. 197 (1965).
41. At a Meeting of the Association of Corporate Patent Counsel, White Sulphur Spring,
W. Va., May 22, 1972, the following colloquy took place:
Bowes: One aspect of this, Dick, that I wish you would clarify for me. It seems to
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Those opponents of codification of permissible patent licensing
practices who argue encroachment on the antitrust laws, reinforce
Professor Oppenheim's concern. Those who argue that the amendments to the patent laws will override the general antitrust law,
suggest that the patent law is an island in the sea of antitrust. The
patent law is based on the U.S. Constitution and the first patent
statute was enacted in 1790-one hundred years before the Sherman
Act. While there was some common law prior to Sherman, it still
remains a fact that the patent system received constitutional and
congressional sanction long before the antitrust problem was treated
by the Congress. It should be apparent that some peaceful interface
was recognized by Congress,"2 yet this interface is being challenged
today. 3
me from what you have said and what others in your unit have said, and McLaren's
'yes-no' test, ancillary and necessary restraints doctrine and so on, that the approach of the Antitrust Division is, to patent licensing, purely an antitrust approach. I remember two or three years ago. Professor Oppenheim, who is regarded
by many as a pretty good antitrust lawyer, said at a LES meeting, in a speech he
made there, that the Department of Justice approach is quite wrong-that the first
test is whether or not the practice is reasonably within the scope of the patent or
patents involved. If it is, that should end the inquiry. If it is beyond that, then the
test you have enunciated, comes into the picture. Would you be willing to count
on that?
Stern: . . . with the greatest respect to Professor Oppenheim and to Ted Bowes,
I submit that that statement is just plain wrong.
42. Senator Sherman recognized this interface between patent and antitrust law by stating that "a limited monopoly secured by a patent right is an admitted exception, for this is
the only way an inventor can be paid for his innovation." 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1889).
43. Once upon a time, patent law and antitrust law were two neighboring kingdoms, and for the most part they lived in harmony, exchanged ambassadors, and
respected each other's sovereignty. There were a few border disputes, and even a
crusade led by Thurman Arnold, but by and large their relationship was one of
peaceful co-existence.
As we know those halycon days are gone forever. The aggressor, of course, has
been antitrust, which has shamelessly asserted its jurisdiction over all forms of
intellectual property-not only patents, but also trademarks and know-how as well.
And it is in the area of licensing, more than any other, where the struggle for
supremacy is primarily being waged today.
Addressed by Earl E. Pollock, before the Patent, Trademark and Copyright and Antitrust
Sections of the American Bar Association, August 1973, reprinted in 42 A.B.A. ANTITRusT L.
J. 631 (1973). On the antitrust-patent law interface, Professor William F. Baxter of Stanford
University has stated:
I would say it is not true that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote free
and open competition and to minimize restraints in every possible context. ...
[11n most contexts, one does that by maintaining free and open markets. But there
are perfectly well-known reasons why, in the context of creating new information,
that is not true; and the patent laws address themselves to that problem. . ..
When a patentee brings new information into existence, he should be able to take
advantage of it in every way. And I would go so far as to say that if every issued
patent were indisputably a valid patent and a commercially valuable patent, then
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The intentions of the Antitrust Division to attack customary and
standard licensing practices may be illustrated by the original section 309 of the Clean Air Act of 1970.11 The section, believed to have
been drafted by the Antitrust Division, was contrary to the Administration's position and required licensing of inventions useful in
connection with clean air, which would have permitted only the
imposition of a royalty, protection of trade secrets, and termination
of the license for breach of either condition. If this belief is correct
it would be a clear indication that the Department of Justice intends that licenses should not have any field or product identification or territorial designation. 5
The Antitrust Division has approved different royalty rates only
when applied to different applications and then only if all uses are
freely licensed. 6 The present position of the Department of Justice
regarding license restrictions has been defined in the following
words:
The validity of licensing practices other than these nine [nine
limitations considered illegal per sel is to be tested under the rule
of reason. The evolution of this rule is also fairly complete. It has
three principal elements. First, the restriction must be ancillary to
carrying out the primary purpose of the agreement. Second, the
scope and duration of the restraint must be no broader than is
necessary to support that primary purpose. And third, the restriction must be otherwise reasonable under the circumstances."
This position is widely considered by the patent bar and some of
the antitrust bar as being contrary to the law as presently developed.48
COMPETITIVE NATURE OF PATENTS
The nature of competition has been well described as the search
by entrepreneurs, self-centeredly, to obtain at the expense of comthere really ought to be no restrictions whatsoever on the way licensfors] went
about exploiting those monopolies.
42 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 55, 85 (1973). The actual quote uses the word "licensees" in the
last sentence. Prof. Baxter has written the author that "licensors" was intended.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (Supp. 1 1971).
45. Turner, The Patent System and Competition Policy, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 450, (1969).
46. Address by Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce B. Wilson, before the Patent
Law Association of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, November 19, 1969.
47. Address by Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce B. Wilson, before the Annual
Joint Meeting of the Michigan State Bar Antitrust and Patent, Trademark and Copyright
Sections, in Detroit, Mich., September 21, 1972.
48. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). See Oppenheim, note 23
supra; Whale, note 30 supra.
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petition, as large a share as possible of the available market.49
Competition may be based on product quality, price, features offered and service provided. Any or all of these characteristics or
factors may be affected by inventions of patentable products and
processes and their protection by issued patents.
To some, it appears paradoxical that in an economic system made
meaningful by competition, there is provided a patent system which
impedes competition "by creating monopolistic shoals in a sea of
competition. . .

One must start with the proposition that patents

do prevent the competitive system from working as well as it
might."

50

This line of reasoning has been a leading factor in emphasizing
the antitrust-patent law interface and resulted in most of the erosion of the patentee-owner's rights. Thus, many courts and lawyers
have accepted the syllogism that patents are monopolies and since
monopolies are bad, patents must be against the public interest and
should be treated harshly. It is an easy step to disclaim any special
status for patents insofar as antitrust considerations are concerned.
It is the thesis of this author that the price-delivery brand of
competition is too simplistic, that there are other forms of competition, and that the net effect on competition is the proper test. It is
not enough that A cannot market product X because B has a valid
patent covering X. In the long run, the competitive system may
work better with exclusivity rights under patents than without
them. 5
It has been suggested that anticompetitive effects result when the
49.

Stedman, Patents and Antitrust-The Impact of Various Economic Approaches,
L. REv. 889, 890 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Stedman].
50. Id. at 893. Stedman continues:
This effect, an undesirable one in the eyes of the dedicated advocate of competition,
is generally deemed acceptable on the grounds that the price of such monopoly is
not too high when viewed in the light of the increased technological development
which is induced by the patent grant.
Id.
51. THE PATENT SYSTEM AND THE MODERN ECONOMY, STUDY OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, S. RES. 167,
STUDY No. 2, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1957) [hereinafter cited as STUDY No. 21.
George Frost said:
The patent system is frequently criticized as inconsistent with the competitive
economy and the antitrust laws. Misconceptions respecting the economic power
conferred by letters patent are responsible for much of this criticism. The fact is
that the system is a stimulus to competitive effort, both in terms of the competitive
activity of existing firms in product and process development and in terms of
inducing the formation and activity of new business based on "new" products
and new processes. The system is accordingly complementary to the antitrust laws
in effectuating the overall public policy of competition on all fronts.
26

MERCER

296
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exclusivity to a patent is extended beyond its normal 17-year life. '"
Such extension has been attributed to delays in issuance of patents
and extensions resulting from improvements which enable patentees to keep ahead of their competitors. Both arguments are more
theoretically than practically persuasive. Delay in patent issuance
is due to Patent and Trademark Office procedures and is not fairly
chargeable against inventors. Extension by patent is largely myth;
it requires that any improvement be so important that sale without
it is impossible. It also assumes that would-be competitors are incapable themselves of designing improvements, i.e., designing
around the patented feature before the patentee can do so, and sitting back to allow the patentee to do all the improving. This does
not accurately reflect the situation in the industrial world.
The economic desirability of the "design-around" approach has
been challenged by economists." Disapproval is based on the alleged misallocation of scarce resources which would, otherwise, be
directed to new technology."4 The worst by-product of the "designaround" approach is the development of a "second-rate" alternative. However, even this result makes a choice available to the
buyer. This is conventional, classical competition: competition with
a better or inferior product. At best, redesign may, and does, result
in important technological advances. In between, there will be products which are better or cheaper, or both.5
Technological competition has another aspect not related to
"design-around." This is the time-hallowed basis for the patent
right, i. e., the disclosure made through the patent. Repeatedly,
technological breakthroughs stimulate scientists and engineers of
diverse disciplines and result in trials to apply the new disclosure
to different problems. Not infrequently, the integration goes far
beyond the disclosed invention.
Of singular importance is competition in the conception,
development, and application of patented inventions as well as the
52.
53.

Stedman, supra note 49, at 894.
Fritz Machlup, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW

OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY OF THE SUBCOMMrr-

TEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, S.

167, STUDY No. 15, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (Comm. Print 1958)
At times the constitutional objectives of advancing the arts and sciences
may be defeated by discouraging rather than stimulating I&I [invention and innovation]. One may, for instance, have a good idea which is blocked by prioir patents.
The patent stimulus may provide an incentive to engage in activities of a less useful
nature than would otherwise engage one's attention. The result may be rather
second-rate "inventing around activity.
Stedman, supra note 49 at 894.
55. STUDY No. 2, supra note 51, at 19 n.67 cites numerous examples. For example, he
describes a successful research program to design around a petroleum cracking method.
RES.

54.
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use of patents as business assets. These activities are in addition to
traditional competition and not substitutes for it because patented
products compete not only with other patented products, but also
with unpatented products.
[It is not the kind of competition [from the maker of an identical
product] which counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new
type of organization [the largest scale unit of control for instance]-competition . . . which strikes not at the margins of
profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lines. This kind of competition is as much
more effective than the other as a bombardment is in comparison

with forcing a door. .... 56
The erosion of the right to license on a wide variety of bases and
the continued pressure to further discourage licensing is, in itself,
anti-competitive. Patents are useful tools in the marketplace. It is
not at all uncommon for competitors to license each other. Such
cross-licenses provide maximum engineering design freedom. Particularly, when a group of patents represents modest improvements
or alternative designs, any hinderance to use is reduced to the cost
of the license. This is removed if the exchange is royalty free. The
only time a license is apt to decrease work in a given direction is
when work in another direction is a better investment of facilities,
funds, and manpower. It may be most economical and least wasteful
of scarce resources to buy engineering (via license) and go on from
there. Maximum freedom in licensing is likely to maximize technological progress, maximize productivity and profitability, and directly or indirectly maximize the public benefit.
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

Because of the erosion of patent owners' rights and attempts at
56. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 84 (3d ed. 1950) (emphasis
added). See also Professor Irving Kayton, Conference on the Public Role of the Inventor, June
11-14, 1973, Monterey, California (Government Printing Office 1974):
The antitrust laws have never since the beginning of time, do not now, nor can ever
inject competition into our society, and certainly not technological feature product
competition. There is only one legal mechanism for doing that, and that is the
patent incentive system used to induce people to invent. Now if you think of a
practical example in the form of a bathtub with a stopper in the bottom, and a
faucet at the top, and the water in the tub being the competitive factors in our
society, the antitrust laws are the stopper in the bottom designed to prevent the
competition from leaking out, and as a passive inactive device, cannot inject water
into it. The patent system, on the other hand, is that active mechanism that
introduces into our society the technological competition which today means more
than anything else.
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further restrictions on permissible licensing provisions, there was an
abundance of evidence to justify patent owners' concerns. These
concerns led Senator Hugh Scott to introduce patent law amendments directed at licensing. 7 The attack on any licensing codification commenced immediately.
Thus, there developed an interesting situation where a presidential commission, the minority leader of the Senate, and the Department of Commerce were recommending clarificationof licensing law
which was widely supported by the patent bar, industry, and inventors, while the Department of Justice and others argued that such
proposals to clarify were really intended to, and might, carve exemptions from antitrust law. Because there appears to be a wide gap
between the contending positions, it is worthwhile to analyze this
situation.
Licensing codification has been viewed by some as an attempt to
overturn existing law." However, it was not the intent of the proponents of licensing reform to create any exemptions from the antitrust law. 5 Any conduct that could be shown in a given case to have,
in fact, created an unreasonable restraint of trade, a substantial
lessening of competition, or formed a part of a conspiracy to monopolize would be beyond the patent right. Yet it was intended, by
appropriate statutory provisions, to prevent certain patent utilization practices regularly found in arrangements of assignment, license, or waiver of patent rights from becoming per se misuse or
illegal in the future. The purpose of these amendments was to allow
responsible parties to follow these acceptable practices, which
usually inure to the benefit of the public and promote competition.
Spokesmen for the Commerce Department testified in support of
such licensing codification 0 and proposed specific statutory language which became the subject of subcommittee consideration.
With the Commerce Department's support, as well as the endorsement of the Small Business Administration," patent reform legisla57. S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See note 3, supra for later developments. The Scott
Amendment to § 261 provided in pertinent part: "An applicant, patentee or his legal representative may also, at his election, waive or grant by license or otherwise, the whole or any
part of his rights under a patent ..
" S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 261(b)(2) (1971). See
generally Comment, The Patent-Antitrust Balance: Proposals For Change, 17 VILL. L. REv.
463 (1972).
58. Hearings,supra note 23 at 271. In fact, Mr. McLaren stated that "it might not reverse
particular cases, but it might substantially undercut them; it might expand the fog that some
claim exists in this area of this field."
59. 116 CONG. REc. 510, 783-94 (daily ed. April 8, 1970) (remarks of Sen. Scott).
60. Hearings, supra note 23 at 228-64.
61. Id. at 521-22.
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tion was proposed in both houses of Congress. "2
Opposition to the licensing codification came from other
branches of government, "3 the academic community, "4 and consumer interest spokesmen. "5 Some emphasized the effect such
sweeping changes would have on the court-evolved balance between
the patent and antitrust laws. " Others claimed these codifications
would consolidate economic power in the hands of the patent owners
who would be able to exert more control over the licensees. 7 The
controversy came down to a choice between legislative reform or
continued reliance on the ad hoc case-by-case approach to the problem.
LEGISLATION V. CASE-BY-CASE

The argument that licensing codification is not necessary implies
that the law is developing satisfactorily on a case-by-case basis and
that aberrations will be taken care of within the court system. This
62. H.R. 11868, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 2930, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
63. Mr. Allen Ward of the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission, at a
meeting of the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association, Washington, D.C., April
2, 1971, stated that there is no evidence that the present law impedes licensing, nor is the
law sufficiently vague to justify legislation; that the impact of the "Scott Amendments" is
essentially negative and will engender litigation rather than reduce it. Mr. Ward, in his
testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on May 12, 1971, followed a similar line of
argument. Hearings, supra note 23 at 304-308. The Scott Amendments were also sharply
criticized by Commissioner Mary Gardiner Jones of the Federal Trade Commission:
I am convinced that these amendments would seriously affect the balance struck
by the courts between the consumers' need for effective competition in order to
provide a brake on the unbridled exploitation of monopoly and market power and
the inventor's need for some assurance of an adequate return. . . . If enacted into
law, these amendments could have a chaotic and seriously injurious impact on the
ability of both the patent and antitrust laws to promote the type of technologically
advanced society and viable and competitive economy which is of such major
significance to the consumers' welfare.
Speech by Commissioner Jones, Fourth New England Antitrust Conference, November 6,
1970, [hereinafter cited as Jones.]
64. Professor James F. Rahl of Northwestern University, at a meeting of the Antitrust
Section of the American Bar Association, in Washington, D.C., April 2, 1971, stated that he
was speaking on behalf of 23 professors opposing the Scott Amendments. It was his position
that none of the amendments had any evidentiary support.
65. See Letter from Mr. Ralph Nader to Senator Hugh Scott, November 18, 1970,
[hereinafter cited as Nader]. Mr. Nader charged that "these Amendments seem to be an
overt attempt by the Patent Bar and the industry it serves to consolidate economic power in
the hands of patent owners at the expense of the American consumer ..
" Nader further
alleged that the amendments "would unjustifiably permit patent owners to exert more control
over their licenses by legalizing certain practices that the courts have consistently condemned, such as compulsory package licensing and royalty payments extending after the life
of the patent."
66. Jones, note 63 supra.
67. Nader, note 65 supra.
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is unlikely given the position taken by the Department of Justice
and to some extent, the antitrust bar.
In the present situation, the case-by-case approach is a very unsatisfactory way to legislate for a number of reasons. First, in keeping
with the adversary system, the court does not have the opportunity
to hear all points of view but, rather, is limited to arguments of
plaintiff and defendant based upon the specific, and often narrow,
fact situation of the particular suit. Indeed, it may not be to the
advantage of either party to take a broad view of the situation and
seek to represent the public interest. In contrast, a congressional
committee can consider many points of view and determine what
course of action will most benefit the largest possible percentage of
interested parties.
Second, the case-by-case approach necessarily takes many years
to establish a coherent body of law. In the meantime, there is uncertainty and industry is unsure of what it can, and cannot do. Businesses often require extensive future planning and should not be
subjected to risks which may cost millions of dollars. 8 Legislation
has the advantage of presenting the public with a uniform body of
law applicable to all situations. While judicial interpretation will be
necessary to flesh out general terms, such test cases are infinitely
more preferable than a case-by-case approach which does not admit
of general application.
Third, judge-made law may be retroactive, thereby affecting actions taken long before the decision was rendered. Not only is the
patent license agreement of the parties to the suit held illegal or
unenforceable, but there may be hundreds or thousands of other
agreements between persons, not parties to the suit, which are rendered illegal or unenforceable by the court's decision. Since Congress is prohibited from passing ex post facto laws,"5 licensing codification would apply only prospectively.
Fourth, allowing the law to evolve on a case-by-case basis,
amounts to asking Congress to abdicate its primary responsibility
under the Constitution. It is not the function of either the Department of Justice or the courts to legislate. As the legislative body,
Congress is best qualified to determine the proper solution. It represents all interests in the nation and has the mechanism, through its
68. For an illustration of the delay caused by the case-by-case approach, note that the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has, on numerous occasions, attempted to
obtain a reversal of United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), involving
certain patent license restrictions, but has, as yet, been unsuccessful. Thus, for over 50 years,
the public has been uncertain whether it can rely on this decision as valid precedent.
69. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 8.
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committees, to hear all points of view and decide what is best for
the particular interests involved and, more importantly, for the general public.
LICENSE LAW CLARIFICATION

Although the late Senator Dirksen first proposed legislation for
license codification or clarification, 0 the first proposal seriously considered by the subcommittee was embodied in the Scott Amendments.7 ' A Department of Commerce revision of these reforms was
defeated in the subcommittee on a three-to-two vote.72 In addition
to the Scott Amendments, bills were introduced by Representative
Smith and Senator Buckley" which followed closely the Commerce
Department's proposals. Both the Department of Commerce and
the Antitrust Division testified extensively before the subcommittee
and presented detailed memoranda.7 4 As expected, the Department
of Justice opposed almost every proposal for license law clarification
while the Department of Commerce supported them. It is enlightening to contrast their positions and analyze at least some of the
arguments presented.
In general, it was proposed, through amendment of section 261,1 '
to make it clear that patent owners, like owners of other forms of
property, are privileged to permit others to use their property-their
patents-on terms generally of their own choosing. Proponents intended to codify the already recognized right of patent owners to
decide whether and to whom to license their patents. Specifically,
it was intended to establish a patent owner's right to assign or
license patents (on an exclusive basis), applications for patents, or
any other 7interests therein. This objective was made clear by Senator Scott.

There is, however, some controversy concerning the meaning of
70. S. 2597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
71. Amendments 23 and 24 to S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). These are the same as
amendments 578 and 579 to S. 2576, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
72. Action by the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary (1971).
73. H.R. 11868, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 2930, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) These bills
were based on a bill developed by a "coordinating committee" consisting of members of the
American Patent Law Association and the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law
of the American Bar Association. While the Patent Section approved substantially the same
bill as was approved by the Board of Managers of the APLA, its approval by the ABA House
of Delegates was not sought. Hence, the bill is not properly claimed to have ABA backing.
74. Department of Commerce, Hearings, note 23 supra, at 22-264; Department of Justice,
Hearings, supra note 23, at 265-286 and 475-517.
75. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
76. 117 CONG. REC. S 3400 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1971).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 8

the phrase in section 261, "for the whole or for any specified part of
the United States."" Many experienced patent practitioners feel
that the present statute clearly authorizes territorial grants or licenses of a territory less than the entire United States. The judiciary
has approved patent licenses granting rights to specified geographi78
cal and trade areas.
A mere non-exclusive license to make, use, and sell in a specified
part of the United States, is, according to proponents, merely a
waiver of an infringement suit in the territory specified. Neither the
patent owner nor a licensee is precluded in any way from operating
in that area in competition with others. Assignment or licensing
enhances the free flow of intellectual property and is especially important to small businesses and individuals with less innovative
capacity. An exclusive territorial grant has been consistently held
to be within the patent grant and, therefore, valid.79 This position,
however, is not universally accepted. Professor William F. Baxter
has made an extensive study of this language and believes that
section 261 is inapplicable to patent licensing."
77.

35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970) states in pertinent part:
Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in
law by an instrument in writing. The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal
representatives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his
application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United
States.
78. Several cases have approved territorial restrictions on licensing. See United States v.
General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926); Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Eisele & Co., 86 F.2d
267 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 667 (1936); Parker v. Haworth, 18 F. Cas. 1135 (No.
10,738)(C.C. Ill.
1848); Suydam v. Day, 23 F. Cas. 473 (No. 13,654) (C.C. N.Y. 1846); Merck
& Co. v. Smith, 155 F. Supp. 843 (D. Pa.), aff'd, 261 F.2d 162 (3rd Cir. 1957).
79. 45 P.T.C.J. D-1 (1971), Patent Licensing Regulations proposed by GSA to implement
Section 2 of the August 23, 1971, Memorandum and Statement of Government Patent Policy
issues by President Nixon.
80. Hearings, note 23 supra, at 238. See also Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation
of the Patent Monoply: An Economic Analysis, 76 YAL L.J. 267, 349 (1966), where he traces
the history of section 261:
Only by amateurish literalism or cynical distortion can it be argued that §261
places a general imprimatur of legality on territorial restrictions. As the total content of the present section and its history shows, the purpose of the provision is
totally irrelevant to the issues discussed in this paper; and the language of §261 can
be given its full intended effect quite consistently with suggestions I have made.
Section 261 has its genesis in §4 of the Patent Act of 1793 which merely authorized
assignment by the patentee of his title and interest in his invention. Statutory
authorization was necessary 'because since patent rights are creatures of statute
and not of common law, the transfer of legal title thereto cannot be regulated by
the rules of the latter system.'
The procedural and formal rigidities of the 19th century between law and equity,
between legal and equitable title, and between contracts and conveyances lead to
distinctions of substantial practical import between patent assignments and patent
licenses. Made in compliance with the statute, and assignment vested in the as-
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The Department of Justice strongly opposed codification, arguing
that it
could be construed to enunciate that the patent owner's right to
exclude may be fragmented into a number of pieces-dividing it
by customers and fields-of-use, for example-and marketed in any
way, regardless of anticompetitive intent or effect."
signee a legal title which was an adequate basis for the commencement by the
assignee of infringement actions, the execution of licenses or further assignments,
and application for extensions of the patent term. A warranty of title was implied
unless negated by the instrument. Legal title prevailed over prior equitable incumbrances if obtained for value and without notice, could be held by several
persons as tenants in common and perhaps by joint tenancy, and was subject to
voluntary, but not involuntary, partition.
But any transfer of interest that did not convey a sufficiently broad range of
interest to the transferee was regarded not as an assignee, a licensee was merely a
contracting party, not a property owner with a title. He received nothing more than
the privilege of practicing the invention to the extent described in the license
without being subject to liability for infringement. Licenses could be written or oral
and did not have to be recorded. Unless the document expressly authorized transfer, a license was not transferable; and if made transferable, it was such only in its
entirety unless expressly made transferable in parts and to a plurality of persons.
Because of the important differences between assignment and license, it was important that there be a sharp definition of that range of interest which was sufficiently broad to be the subject of assignment as opposed to license. No such definition was written into the 1793 provision. This deficiency was corrected in the 1836
act which assimilated to the assignment category "every grant ... of the exclusive
right . . . to make and use, and to grant to others to make and use the thing
patented within and throughout any specified part . . . of the United States."
Transfers of that breadth were required to be recorded and were regarded as the
minimum quantum of interest to which the qualities of "property" and "title"
attached; and with those qualities went a complex body of interpretive rules. Finally in 1870 an express statement of the sanction for failure to record, nullity as
against a bona fide purchaser, was added. When reprinted in the Revised Statutes
of 1875, the section was broken into two sentences; in 1897, the sentence making
certificates of notaries prima facie evidence of execution of an assignment was
added; in 1941 the section was expanded to include applications as well as patents;
and in 1952 the several sentences were rearranged into their present order, placing
the paragraph relating to certificates between the authorization to assign and the
requirement of recordation.
As a consequence of these technical modifications the basic authorization to
transfer by assignment rather than by license interests of a minimal quantum now
stands alone in the first principal paragraph of §261 and is susceptible to being
misread as a legalization for all purposes of assignments of exlusiwe right to a
specified part of the United States. But that reading is wholly erroneous. The
section remains today what it has been for over a century: a demarcation of the
dividing line between interests sufficiently extensive to be transferred by assignment and those which are to be transferred by license. The modern reader, less
sensitive than his predecessors to refined distinctions between contract and conveyance, legal and equitable title, and persons who are and are not proper parties in
interest, is liable to err; but internal corroboration of the original purpose is present
in the section: It deals with assignments, not licenses; and the sentence that is
critical for present purposes still reads, "The ...
patentee . . . may, in like manner (i.e., by assignment), grant an exclusive right ..
to . . . any specified part."
81. Hearings, note 23 supra, at 272.
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According to the proponents of codification, anticompetitive effect
or intent is immaterial so long as the licensing provision is reasonably related to the exclusive right. It is also believed that the
Department of Justice's position unduly subordinates patent law to
antitrust considerations.
The Department of Justice further contends that "this language
suggests that the patent grant is a 'bundle' of several different
rights, not the constitutionally based right to exclude others from
making, using, and selling the invention. '82 The answer to this
charge is that while the constitutional grant, with brevity and clarity, establishes the right of exclusivity, it does not negate partial
surrender of that exclusivity. As has been discussed, it is in the
public interest that patent owners have maximum freedom and that
prospective manufacturers and sellers have maximum access to patent licenses, according to their needs. This is best and most practically accomplished by adopting the theory which allows fragmentation of the exclusive right.
The Antitrust Division does "not object to field-of-use restrictions
as a general rule where they have a legitimate primary purpose, are
not unduly broad and do not have a substantial anticompetitive
effect."" The courts have upheld these license restrictions when
they are reasonably within the reward which the patentee is entitled
by his grant of patent." However, the Department of Justice maintains that "field-of-use licensing, used to divide customers or markets, or which in operation, injured the public may well be unlawful." 15 The antitrust advocates fear that the patentee could "fragment his patent grant in such a manner as to impose price-fixing,
tie-ins, and other such anti-competitive arrangements."' ' But proponents of licensing reform contend the "rule of reason" for patent
licenses would not bar regulation of such anticompetitive activities.
82. Id. The bundle of rights theory was recognized as early as Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U.S.
1 (1912).
83. Hearings, note 23 supra, at 272.
84. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938). See also
Armstrong v. Motorola, Inc., 374 F.2d 764 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967); Benger
Labs, Ltd. v. R.K.. Laros, 209 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd per curiam, 317 F.2d 455
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963); Sperry Products, Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 171 F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 285 F.2d 911 (6th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 890 (1961); United States v. Birdsboro Steel Foundary &
Machine Co., 139 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
85. Hearings, note 23 supra, at 273. The Government has also taken the position that
General Talking Pictures was limited by Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386
(1945), and Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940). See Hearings, note
23 supra, at 494.
86. Hearings, note 23 supra, at 273.
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LICENSE CODIFICATION PROVISIONS

Codification of the right to license would have beneficial eflects
in several situations which are presently the subject of controversy.
Exclusive Licenses
Legislative approval of the right to grant exclusive licenses is
important to proponents because Antitrust Division lawyers, in particular, and some members of the antitrust bar seem to look askance
at exclusive licenses. There is a tendency to apply the antitrust rule
of reason to all patent license provisions. As pointed out by Professor
Oppenheim, 7 the antitrust rule of reason is inapplicable so long as
the terms of the license agreement are reasonably within the scope
of the patent grant. Since the Constitution and the patent statutes
provide for an exclusive right under a patented invention, it is entirely reasonable that a patent owner should be able to pass on that
exclusivity in its entirety or with respect to a particular field or other
grant of less than the entire right.
Number of Licenses
The last clause of section 261(b) provides that the licensor may
grant licenses to "parties of his selection." 8 This means that he may
grant one license or a plurality of licenses, but having granted one
license, he is not required to grant licenses to all comers.
Length of Term
Proponents of licensing reform believe that a patent owner should
be able to waive part of the term, i.e., license less than the full term
of a patent. An express condition with respect to the duration of a
license without regard to the length of patent life was upheld in Cole
v. Hughes Tool. Hughes leased bits to drillers on the condition that
the bits be returned to Hughes when they had served their useful
life. The court upheld the Hughes practice noting that the lease
agreement merely conditioned the termination of the right to use
the patented product upon a future event. This amounted to a time
limitation on the license.
Form of Use
With respect to a license specifying the nature of form of use
permitted, it has been held appropriate to limit a license to styles
87.
88.
89.

Oppenheim, note 23 supra.
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
215 F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1954).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 8

or classes authorized on the ground that such narrow licenses affect
only the use of the patented invention and are within the patent
grant.9 0 This is logically the case so long as the licensee is not positively prohibited from making products or using processes which are
not covered by the subject matter of the patent or from operating
outside of the scope of the license.
Limited Right to Sell
The judiciary has sanctioned the use of a covenant in a license
which permitted the sale of patented devices only in a specified
combination. In Vulcan v. Maytag,9 ' the defendant accepted a license containing a positive prohibition against the sale of any patented parts separately or together with washing machines other
than the type specified. The court observed that there was no obligation on the licensor to grant a license. Since there was no commercial demand for washing machines without the patented attachment, the licensor had a legitimate monopoly, even though the
machines themselves were unpatented.
This is a situation brought about by the excellence of the patented
article in a commercial sense, and not by any arrangement, contract or other act of the patentee other than the bare ownership of
the patent and the monopoly of use of the subject-matter covered
thereby. 2
The legality of a simple license should be just as obvious.
The proposed reform would appear to authorize the licensing of a
stated quantity or not more than a specified quantity. Licenses of
this narrow nature have apparently been considered in the past to
be within the scope of the patent grant, at least to the extent that
there has been a limit on the total number of patented items to be
made by the licensee. It is a different question if the licensor attempts to restrict the licensee with regard to the number of unpatented items made by the licensee, the latter being outside the scope
of the patent.
The most troublesome situations arise where unpatented devices
or products are involved, as for example, the making of unpatented
products on patented machines or by the use of patented processes.
The patent grant conceivably includes the right to limit the use of
90.
1960),
91.
92.

See, e.g., Sperry Products, Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 285 F.2d 911 (6th Cir.
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 890 (1961).
73 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1934).
Id. at 139.
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a patented process. It would seem proper, therefore, to indicate the
number of times the process can be used without regard to the
patentability of the product produced by the process. The degree of
restraint is reasonable in light of the fact that, in the absence of any
license, the public's exposure to and benefit from the patented item
would be considerably diminished. Any quota specification relates
directly to and limits the extent of use of the patented machine or
process. To the extent that the licensee is licensed only as to the use
of the patented process or machine, but is free to make any number
of unpatented items by processes or machines other than those licensed, a quota specification is within the scope of the patent.
There is, possibly, some conflict of authority. In American Equipment Co. v. Tuthill,13 the imposition of penalty royalties if more
bricks than specified in the license were manufactured was held not
to be a license provision but price-fixing and a quantity production
limitation, the inevitable result of which was unreasonable restraint
of commerce. This result is arguably correct inasmuch as the production limit applied to the total number of unpatented bricks produced by the licensee, and not merely the quantity manufactured
by the patented machines. In this case, there was also evidence of
a background of restrictive practices which indicated that the purpose of the contract was to control the price of unpatented bricks.
In the Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson,94 there was one license
authorizing the manufacture and use of patented apparatus only for
producing unpatented swabs having cotton at one end and another
regulating the number of unpatented swabs with cotton tips at both
ends that could be manufactured by the licensee. The court framed
the issue as follows:
Whether the patentee of a machine for the manufacture of an
unpatented product may, by grant of a license to manufacture and
use the patented machine, restrict the number or type of unpatented products made with the patented machine."
The licensing arrangement was upheld after the court found that
the licensor had not attempted to prevent the manufacture of the
unpatented swabs, nor had it attempted to establish a price for
which the unpatented product must be sold. The agreement merely
conditioned use of the patented machine by limiting the number of
units produced. 6
93.
94.
95.
96.
There,

69 F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1934).
109 F. Supp. 657 (D.N.J. 1951).
Id. at 660.
Id. But see United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
a quantity provision was held improper because of price-fixing.
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MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM QUANTITY PROVISIONS

Minimum quantity provisions are commonly used to ensure the
patent owner a satisfactory return. Such an arrangement does not
restrict production and seems to have no illegal connotations. On
the other hand, a maximum quantity may restrict production and
must be examined against the background of the patent grant. If the
sole feature objected to is the licensing of a specified maximum
number of units, the grant would appear reasonable under existing
patent law. This is particularly true if the licensed subject matter
is clearly covered by patents. 7
United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.9" is of interest
in this connection. The license contained a provision that if Sylvania's sales under the licensed patents exceeded a specified percentage of its total sale, increased payments would be made. Actually,
Sylvania's full production was covered by patented subject matter.
However, it seemed to be clear from the arrangement that Sylvania
was not required to pay any royalty on any types it made or sold
which were not covered by the patent. In upholding the legality of
this approach, the court found that the royalty provision did not
limit Sylvania's production and further, without a license, Sylvania
would have been unable to compete.
Customer Categories
The proposed provision would codify the present law with respect
to designation of customer categories. It is proper to classify customers according to the expected and usual use to which they will put
the patented subject matter; licenses to sell to customers who will
use solely for the prescribed purposes have been upheld. The 1960
case of Aluminum Co. of America v. Sperry Products,Inc. 99 involved
a license under which Sperry was licensed to make converters and
sell them for use only with the licensor's reflectoscopes. In upholding
the legality of this license, the court found that Sperry could have
prevented sales or sued a user for infringement. Sperry was legaily
entitled to be free from competition in the use of the products falling
within the scope of its patents. The court noted that no trade was
unlawfully restrained and that as a result of the agreement, an
article was introduced into commerce that might otherwise have
97. In the situation in which the licensor grants a series of licenses on a quota basis as,
for example, 20 percent to each of five licenses, there would seem to be a problem raised
outside the patent laws. Thus, the legality of a maximum quota provision would seem to
depend on whether the limitation places any ancillary limitation on activities of the parties.
98. 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
99. 285 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1960).
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been withheld from the market.
Licenses authorizing sale to customers who normally will use or
resell the patented subject matter in designated areas were upheld
as early as 1874 in Dorsey Revolving HarvesterRake Co. v. Bradley
ManufacturingCo. 00oDorsey had a license authorizing him to manufacture apparatus for use in four specified states. The court found
infringement with respect to a seller who knowingly sold to parties
who bought for export to and use in foreign countries.
A patent owner may properly authorize a licensee to sell to one
outlet or less than all outlets such as wholesalers, jobbers, retailers,
agents, and users. However, a license authorizing a manufacturer to
sell patented devices to customers individually approved or licensed
by the owner of the patented subject matter is more restrictive of
commerce than is a license to sell to designated classes of customers.
In the former, the licensor and licensee must agree to the sale
whereas in the latter any of the class qualify for purchase. So long
as the granting of approval or issuance of a license to prospective
customers by the patent owner is unaccompanied by any subsidiary
return operating after sale, the licensing program is proper under
the current state of the law. A narrow manufacturing license is
within the scope of the patent because it goes no further than regulating a licensee's right to sell patented devices.
License of Patent Application
An amendment to section 261(b) would further serve to clarify a
patent applicant's right to license others. Although the proposed
amendments did not expressly state that remuneration can be received for a license under an application, this is nonetheless a reasonable consequence of the right to license.
In summary, the proposed amendment to section 261 was intended to make clear that the owner of a patent may, with respect
to his patent:
(1) sell all;
(2) sell part;
(3) license all;
(4) license part;

(5) choose
(6) choose
(7) license
(8) license
(9) license
100.

buyer (assignee);
licensee or licensees;
exclusively;
non-exclusively;
both exclusively and non-exclusively.

7 F. Cas. 946 (No. 4015) (C.C. N.Y. 1874).
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Opponents argue that a license of less than all rights could enable
patent owners to divide markets or territories among possible competitors. It appears more correct to say that when a licensor licenses
others on a partial basis, he increases the number of suppliers to the
public and enhances the likelihood of competition. Without the
owner's permission, in the form of a license, others could not use the
patent at all.' 0' The proposal does not give licensees freedom to use
partial licenses to escape all responsibility under the antitrust laws.
It would, however, make it clear that partial licenses are not per se
violations of the antitrust law.
The present section 271 defines patent infringement and specifies
three situations which do not constitute defenses against charges of
infringements.10 Generally speaking, the proposals for clarification
would add to this list and also clarify the doctrine of licensee and
assignor estoppel.
CLARIFICATION OF LICENSEE AND ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL

Not unexpectedly, there are times when a licensee is no longer
satisfied with his license arrangement, either because conditions
have changed or because he struck a poor bargain. Changed circumstances may lead to an attempt by the licensee to terminate the
agreement. In Lear v. Adkins, 03 the Supreme Court overruled a line
of cases dating back to 1856,104 which held that, by virtue of the
licensing agreement, the licensee was estopped from challenging the
validity of the licensor's patent. Noting the inequity inherent in the
theory, as well as the public interest in discouraging the longevity
of worthless patents, the Court voided an express obligation not to
contest validity. Similarly, a no-contest clause as a condition to a
settlement of litigation has been held improper' 5 and a plurality of
licenses containing irrevocable covenants never to contest validity
may violate the Sherman Act. 06
A modification of the result was proposed by the Department of
Commerce in 1971.1o7 According to that Department, the holding in
101. Department of Commerce, Hearings, note 23 supra at 223.
102. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1970). The following acts attributable to the patent owner do not
constitute defenses to a charge of infringement: (1) derivation of revenue from acts which, if
performed by another with his consent, would constitute contributory infringement of the
patent; (2) licensing or authorizing another to perform acts which, if performed without his
consent, would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; or (3) seeking to enforce
his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement.
103. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
104. Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289 (1856).
105. Kraly v. National Distillers, 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 51 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
106. Hearings, note 23 supra, at 275.
107. Id. at 256.
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Lear, designed to circumvent inequity, may, in fact, promote it in
a situation where the licensee seeks to avoid infringement by taking
out the license initially, but subsequently avoid the payment of
royalties by challenging the validity of the underlying patent. Consequently, bad faith challenges by licensees may be encouraged,
while licensors are seriously hampered in enforcing valid licensing
agreements and ultimately discouraged from licensing at all. The
end result is obviously deleterious to the public's interest in the
accessibility of the patented article.
The Department of Commerce proposed retention of the right to
contest validity, but urged that Lear be modified to allow termination by the licensor, thus enabling him to license a third party. This
proposal would more equitably approach a balancing of the competing interests involved.
The Department also called attention to the potential chaos
which would result from opening state courts to validity adjudications, as in suits to enforce contracts. Its solution is to provide
''automatic removal of patent license suits to an appropriate district
court" when validity is challenged.'"' The Department of Justice
approves, at least in principle, removal of patent licensing challenges to "an appropriate Federal forum" and relief to licensees in
the form of termination of the license agreement.'
The Department of Justice faulted the original Scott amendments for requiring licensees to terminate, with respect to all
licensing claims and patents, as a precondition to a validity challenge only with respect to contested rights. The Department of
Commerce proposal gives the licensor the selective right to terminate wholly or in part. In the latter event, a court may determine
suitable royalty provisions. Perhaps total termination is more relief
than necessary.
The Department of Commerce's proposal bars antitrust or misuse
implications through the mere existence of a "no-contest" clause.
The Department of Justice claims that to this extent the proposal
would be "directly contrary to Bendix v. Balax."" ° It is not clear
that Bendix made such clauses per se illegal. In any case, the "nocontest" clause can be expected to disappear from the scene in light
of these court decisions.
The assignor estoppel proposal requires restoration of consideration received as a precondition to challenge the assigned patent, or
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 285.
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payment of an amount determined by the court to equal the value
of such payment.
The Department of Justice position is essentially in keeping with
its views on licensee estoppel, although it has not made its precise
position known on court-determined restorations. Proponents of
this provision claim it appears reasonable and desirable to take care
of the situation where consideration involves other than money payments.
RULE OF REASON

Considered by many the most important proposal, and strongly
supported by the Department of Commerce, is a proposed codification of a patent rule of reason."' As drafted, this addition to section
271 provides that neither misuse nor illegal extension of patent
rights would result when a patent owner grants a license which
excludes or restricts conduct in a manner that is reasonable under
the circumstances at the time the license agreement is made or
offered to be made, to secure to the patent owner the full benefits
of his patent grant .... "I
The burden of establishing misuse or illegal extension is placed
upon the party asserting such defense. Under the proposal, five
licensing practices would be excepted from the rule of reason. Consequently, these practices would fall under the antitrust rule of
reason, thus possibly rendering them per se antitrust violations.
These are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

price fixing;
tie-ins;
resale requirements;
refrain from dealing;
joint licensee-licensor control over additional license.

The Department of Justice at one time accepted this proposal as
a compromise solution to the Scott Amendment language, but subsequently changed its position. Despite the formidable support for
this proposal, the Department of Justice presently opposes its enactment as an "inadequate and unworkable" solution to the prob3
lem.1
To free "parties from the risk that unpredictable economic circumstances or judicial holdings might turn a lawful contract into an
unlawful one," the Department of Commerce's proposal sets the
111.
112.
113.

See Bement v. National Harrow Co. 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 271(f) (1971).
Hearings, note 23 supra, at 282.
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time for judging reasonableness of a license "as of the time it was
made." The Department of Justice strongly opposes this section on
the ground that it "would enact a special antitrust 'rule of reason'
standard in the area of patent licensing heavily biased toward upholding anticompetitive patent licensing restriction.""' To the extent this is true, it is merely a proper codification of the case law.
Contrary to assertions by the Department of Justice, a codification of existing law is necessary, especially in light of the opposition
to most patent licensing emanating from that Department.1
Spokesmen for the Department have also contended that the language used in the proposed amendments is unclear, thus necessitating judicial interpretation on a case-by-case basis. However, there
is no reason to believe that a codification of existing law will spur a
flood of litigation. Certainly the volume of cases would be no greater
than at present. More importantly, judicial interpretation of the
amendments as applied to specific practices would proceed from a
presumption of prima facie propriety, a presumption not presently
accorded challenged practices.
A major focus of the Justice Department's memorandum was a
lengthy discussion of per se antitrust rules. The Department's position is that
this proposal to overrule per se antitrust rules involving patents
not only would reverse many years of established law but is totally
unwarranted. Per se rules voice only in situations where it is quite
apparent that the conduct under scrutiny has no possible justification."'
In this context, reference was made to Northern Pacific Ry. v.
United States"' which in turn cited Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States"' and Standard Oil Co. v. United States." 5 Although
this per se illegality argument is sound in non-patent cases, it is
inapplicable to cases involving patents. Moreover, the proposed
codification is no attempt to overrule per se rules; the undeniable
fact is there are no per se patent antitrust rules. The per se rules
evolved in non-patent contexts and have been applied to patent
114. Id. at 275-85.
115. See United States v. Aircraft Manufacturers Association, Inc., P.T.C.J. No. 237
(July 24, 1975).
116. Hearings, note 23 supra, at 500.
117. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
118. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
119. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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situations only when the practice is an unreasonable use of the
patent grant. 2 0
SPECIFIC ROYALTY OR PAYMENT PRACTICES
The drafters of the clarification amendments were not content
merely to obtain codification of the rule of reason but further outlined special situations which should not, in themselves, render
applicants or owners guilty of misuse or illegal extension. The following payment requirements, standing alone, would not constitute
an illegal agreement:
(1) the amount of payment;
(2) the time of payment, except that payments after expiration
must be based solely on activities prior to expiration;
(3) the base on which payment is determined;
(4) the extent of use of the Patent right;
(5) a payment not segregated on particular patents or claims
(package licensing);
(6) the existence of differing payment arrangements.
The Commerce Department maintains that this section identifies
commonly used royalty or pricing practices which, standing alone,
parties should be able to include in patent licensing agreements,
and that if other factors or circumstances are present, the proposed
rule of reason would be applied.
Amount of Royalties
The Department of Commerce provision approves freely negotiated royalties of any amount and would, to a certain extent, overrule
American Photocopy Equipment Co. v. Rovico, Inc.'2 1 which found
improper "exorbitant, oppressive" royalties.'22 Since absent a patent a seller could charge his customers any price, proponents of this
provision maintain that the patent owner should be able to do the
same. However, the Department of Justice contends that permitting
120. For example, the Department of Justice memorandum refers to United States v.
Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927), which established price-fixing as a per se
violation because there could be no justification for the action other than restraint of competition. The Department then argues that "there is simply no reason why an exception should
be made in the case of patents." Hearings, note 23 supra. Proponents of patent licensing
reform would argue that the per se non-patent rule of Trenton Potteries, as well as other per
se rules, are not necessarily applicable to patent cases. United States v. General Electric Co.,
272 U.S. 476 (1925). The reason patents should not be placed under the general antitrust rule
lies in their constitutional underpinnings.
121. 359 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1966), on remand, 257 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Ill. 1966), aff'd, 384
F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1967).
122. American Photocopy v. Rovico, Inc., 359 F.2d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 1966).
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a price "in any amount" would lead to abuses of the royalty practice
to either exclude new entrants from the market,.' force the purchase
of unpatented products,'24 or compel the acceptance of package licensing agreements." 5 To legalize such royalty provisions would be
to overrule a series of cases condemning such discriminatory or arbitrary practices, according to the Department of Justice.'26
Time of Payment
Another feature of this section is the express approval of royalty
payments after the expiration of the patent, provided the making,
using, or selling took place during the patent term. While proponents see this as entirely proper, the Justice Department takes the
position that the proposed language could have the effect of modifying the doctrine that post-expiration royalties are illegal because the
language goes beyond mere postponement of royalties due for preexpiration use of the patent. Since the proposal justifies payment
based solely upon activities prior to such expiration, the exclusive
right might be achieved by stating in the contract that later payments were based upon pre-expiration activities. An illegal extension of the patent monopoly would result where the clause merely
disguised the collection of royalties for post-expiration use. Conceding the validity of this proposition, it nevertheless addresses a deceptive practice which is infrequently attempted and easily discovered, thus posing a de minimus threat of abuse of this particular
provision.
Royalty Base
The Justice Department maintains that a "blanket authorization
to exact royalties not measured by the patent grant or extent of use,
which these amendments might do, would change the basic principle that one should not exact royalties" for something not patented. 27 Proponents argue that the concern is unlikely and that nonpatented products are only nominally serving as a royalty base.
Since it is for the convenience of the parties and is voluntary, benefits accrue to all.
The Department of Commerce recognizes that "complex royalty
123. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
124. Barber Asphalt Corp. v. La Fera Grecco Contracting Co., 116 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1940).
125. American Security Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959); Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Research, Inc., 388 F.2d 25
(7th Cir. 1967), aft'd, 395 U.S. 100 (1969). The Supreme Court approved convenience of the
parties while condemning unilateral pressure.
126. Hearings, note 23 supra, at 265-86.
127. Id. at 265-70.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 8

determinations may be avoided by basing royalties on factors other
than the actual use of the patented invention."' 28 Automatic Radio
v. Hazeltine2" illustrates this point. In that case the license agreement provided for a low royalty on all radio production without
regard to use of Hazeltine patents rather than a higher rate on
infringing receivers only. This minimized the expense and inconvenience of determining which claims of which patents were applicable, the selling prices and quantities of each receiver sold, and simplified accounting. The Commerce proposal recognizes that royalties computed with no regard for actual use of inventions might be
used illegally, but believes they would not be protected under this
section.
Package Licensing
The proposal also approves package licensing where charges for
individual patents are not segregated. While the Department of
Commerce recognizes that package licenses can entail compulsion,
the "section is not intended to sanction forcing of entire packages
on reluctant licensees," but asserts that the "line of cases condemning such package licensing practices [including American Security
Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp.,'0] would be unaffected.''3
This proposal codifies Well Surveys v. Perfo-Log3 2 and
McCullough Tool v. Wells Surveys 3 3 permitting royalties in package
licenses which do not diminish as individual patents expire. The
Department of Commerce claims this is a "completely acceptable
consequence of arms-length bargaining," and sees "no reason for
forbidding such royalty arrangements.' 3 Moreover, package licenses are often extremely convenient to both parties. Justice Department spokesmen voiced opposition to these provisions on the ground
that they sanction compulsory licensing and exaction of royalties
not based on any patented subject matter. The first point may be
justified since the proposal does not limit package licensing to voluntary situations. However, no valid objection is raised with reference to the exaction of royalties. There is no basis for charging
royalties when no patents are infringed, and no real problem is seen
in choosing a royalty rate or rates which average the value of varying
128. Id. at 265-68.
129. 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
130. 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
131. Hearings,note 23 supra, at 228-65.
132. 396 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1968).
133. 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965).
134. Hearings, note 23 supra, at 228-33.
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patent rights over the package life. The result is a simplified and
effective arrangement. Conversely, where varying rates are assigned
to each patent of a package, arrangements involving several patents
become unmanageable.
Different Payment Arrangements
Another provision would authorize licenses providing for royalty
rates which differ among licensees. This proposal was prompted by
the difficulty encountered by patent owners in negotiating licenses
where royalties are limited to a predetermined rate. The circumstances of each licensor-licensee agreement are unique and a license
may simply be worth more to some licensees than to others. This
provision in no way impairs the right of a licensee to bargain for the
best possible terms. Furthermore, the allowance of varying royalty
rates would diminish the tendency of potential infringers to risk
suit rather than pay what is considered an inappropriate rate.
The Justice Department opposes this proposal on the ground that
it may sanction discriminatory royalties in all circumstances, regardless of anticompetitive intent or effect. While recognizing that
differing royalty rates are not always discriminatory, that Department relies upon case law which holds predatorily motivated discrimination and monopolistic restraint illegal. However, the Commerce Department maintains that these cases warrant the application of the patent, rather than the antitrust, rule of reason and that
such application could alter the result in this type of case.
Licensing of Less Than Total Right
The last of the proposed license codifications would eliminate, as
a defense, the licensing of less than all rights, including rights to less
than all of the territory, patent term, uses, forms, quantities, or
number of operations. This recommendation should be coupled with
section 261 proposals previously discussed. It is intended, according
to the Commerce Department's memorandum, to codify General
Talking Pictures and its progeny. However, this provision would not
immunize from the antitrust laws or the doctrine of patent misuse
any license for less than the entire patent rights where the license
also imposes improper conditions or where there are factors which
require evaluation under a rule of reason. The application of the
patent rule of reason would operate to prohibit improper fragmentation of the patent into submonopolies.
CONCLUSION

An exceedingly thorough case has been made for license law legislation, largely clarification and codification. Moreover, with minor
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exceptions, no change in the existing state of case law on antitrust
standards, no proposal for antitrust exemptions has been offered,
and no intention to seek relaxation of the application of the antitrust laws is in evidence. No opponent of license law legislation has
shown any such intent or any substantial likelihood that anything
other than codification or clarification would result from the enactment of the so-called Scott Amendments, or the Commerce Department or the Smith-Buckley versions of clarifications.
However, because of the widespread controversy, it may be wisest
to consider no more than codification or passage of a patent rule of
3
reason, patterned after General Electric and Bement.' 1
135.

Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).

